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Cross-Border Banking: Threat ot Opportunity to
Economic Growth and Financial Stability
Abiodun Adedipe"
Abstract
Cross-bordtr banking was not a major issre in economic grovth and
banks became large in siqe, began to

d

d later

b

engage

rtabili| of thefnarcial

gstem until

in interratiotal transadions diredllfrom tbeir home comtriu

establirbing or acquiitg bank: across tbeir bordtrs, and tbe buel of intenational actittities oJ

banks irtensfied tbrorylt catrphx produts tbat inreased exposrre to ystenic risk andpossible losses to lbe

ennoml. There is

erid.ence ott botb

tidts to the argrment that cro:s-border

oP?ort.tniy to eczronic growth andfnancial stabili\. This paper argrx

barking

ubdt,

botb a threat and an

stbe dorre toens re tbdt

tbe oppotutnities oatueigh tbe tbreats.

I.
7-\
It
\J

Introduction
ross-border banking has its roots in the eady years of banking, when the banks
saw the need to expi'na ar,.

g"ogr"pt ical scopeof their services to unbanked areas

and locations that host economic activities relating to their home bases. Thete was

in the less developed countries then, the reference to banl<s in the'meropolis'comingto the
colonies to estab[sh branch offices to mobilize deposits and finance the local purchases

of

raw materials and other inputs for manufacturing in their home countries.

Cross-borderbankinghasitsrootsintheearlyyearsofbanking,whenthe
ex?arsion of the scope of banks' services to unbanked areas and locations that host
economic activities connecting to their home bases was fashioned along the teritorial
exploits of the political class. It was, therefore, the pattern for a bank whose home counffy,
for example, is the United Kingdom

pI!

to establish

a

branch in Nigeria or Ghana, wh.ich

of UK until they gained political independence. As such, sourcing of raw
materials and othet inputs for manufacturing rcivittes nUK needed localfnancing that could

was a colony

not be done effectively ftom the home country.
' Dr. Abiodun Adedipe is

a
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Indeed, this was a major motivation for the establishment

of

47/4

the African Banking

Corporation in 1892 that metamorphosed in 1894 into what is known today

N&fia Ph. A similar

argument goes

December 2009

as

FirstBalk of

for the colonial bank that was esrablished in

(acquired by Barclays Bank in 1925 and nost

U

on Bank

1917

of Nigeia Pl4. As time went on,

banks began to pttrxte buiness o??ortmirtes outside the terdtories that their home countries
tion andgblati4fuZof the 20d and early

had political dominion over. The rapid

21"' century made large business organizations and banks especially

to

seek for

ggub and

brofit obbortsnities outside their traditional markets.

Intensified globalization broke national/regional barriers and offered the opportunities for
efficienn imbrouemcn!

^nd

berforTrranft erhancement

competition. This came either in th e form of

in bankins services throush cross-border

brancbes

or stbsidiaies thatbanks established

in

rdonal groups and collaborations
mushroomed, the srategy shifted from direct setting up of branches to ,rrergeff drrd
acqtisitiols (I{&A) of eisting banks in target host countdes, and raised a number of
their host countries. As the wodd economy evolved and

concerns about stability

of the financial

system, crisis preemption and resolution, along

with several otherissues in cross-border banking.

The extension

of the frontiers of

cross,border banking through M&A was particulatly

motivated by the regional banking system

long list

of

these are

a

of regulation in the E nropean Union There

reasons why financial institutions engage
te obuioas. some have been

is

a

in cross-border banking. Some of

identified in existinu and burseonins literalare on

cross-border banking, but some infetted from the aclsal ?ractice
bebauiarlr
^nd
border.banks.

of

cross-

This paper examines t}re reasons for cross-border banking, some stylized facts that link the

growth and findncial stability implications

of

cross-border banking, generates some

recommendations for banking regulatoty authotities and then draws some conclusions.

II.

Why Cross-Border Banking?

Financiai institutions engage in cross-border banking for various reasons including the
following, among others:
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Host countdes' cteditworthiness, which is measured in terms of sovereign risk and
rating. The more credit worthy

a

country is, the more attractive it is for cross-botder

banks seeking growth opportunities outside their current jurisdictions.

ii.

Quality of institutional environment, which is largely a reflection of what the
government and financial system regulatory authorities have done over time. The
stronger the institutional arrangement, the more aftractive the target jurisdictionis.

in.

Easily identiFred gtowth opportunities, which obviously are not being maximized
by the banks presendy in operation.

ir'.

or proximity bias, which reflects similarities in culture, regulation and
banking practices that inspire confidence in the prospecting cross-border banks.
This for example, is why banks operating in Nigeria have found it relatively
Regional

atftactive to cross borders within the West African sub-region.

v.

Promise

of

scale economies, which

follow the atgument of 'bigger is better'. This

telies on the assumption that bigger banks will have more opportunity to reduce

tleir

of doing business and reduce the cost of capital raising. There is also the
argument that bigger banks ate psychologically accepted as unlikely to fail,
following the line of '"fbo Big To Fail", which attracts paronage in the tlinking of
cost

'flight to safety' by depositors.

vi.

fusk diversification in u/hich ctoss-border banks are able to spread or shift their
risks across borders, and thereby reduce their vutrnerabiliry in tlre event that afly
the latge number

vii.

of risks that banks

ate exposed to ctystallizes.

Uquidity enhancement, especially when the oppotunity for deposit grovth
become limited by the force

of

of competition and thete

has

is perceived competitive

adlzntage that the prospective cross-bordet bank can develop and/or utilize.

vin.

Income expansion through asset creation where the credit market in the target

country is expanding ot

it is still at t}re rudimentary

sage. This

of

course,

ptesupposes that the prospective cross-border bank has lending skills and capacity
that match the characteristics

ix.

of the target market.

Trade financing and facilitation whenever the direction

of uade satistics and future

oudook recommend tl'rat the ptesence in existing locations would

be

complemented by establishing cross-border banks in the countries that are existing
ot emetging ttade paftnefs.

144

Central Bank

x.

Regulatory arbitraging is another sffong reason, although

ofNigeria

Economic and Financial

Review

Volume

47/4

December 2009

not so commonly

established, why financial institutions engage in cross-border banking. Where there

is perceived weak regulation in a jurisdiction relative to present counties of
operation, banks might Frnd it attractive to engage in cross-border banking. Veak
regulation enables value creation through strange business oppottunities, and could
be

of tremendous attraction.

The last of tlrese reasons might appear untenable, but an examination

of

rhe

czn?hiy of

many cross-border banks (in their sructures, business lines and product delivety systems)
suggest that this could be a strong argument for cross-border banking. The arguments that
have been made in support

of

some

of the other

reasons are summarized as follows in some

selected evidence-based research.

of
of

Capital flows and entry

foreign banks into a host coufltry have been found to be

of the qualiq
sntries' institstions, erommir and jliratdal o4etrnest, pliiuLlt4bifL
znd proath lbblrt niti?s. Eichensreen (2000) had an excelent review of caDitzl flo$/

fi.-rnctions

determinants, while Clatke et al. (2003) gave a good review of foreign bank entry.

In particular, countries providing an environment with these attributes were found to have
alaactud mzre

findings

foreign banks than those lacking in these areas. This is quite similar to the

of the series of

annual reports on 'Doing Business' that emanate from the surveys

conducted by the Vodd Bank and International Finance Corporation. For banks seeking

growth opportunities outside of their local markets, the motivation has been found to be
keen com?etition znd

linied kcat narkex that shrunk margins on ransactions. In the process,

they seek not mere migtation to another jurisdiction, but to explore the benefits that size

(through ctoss-bordet expansion) may confer on an internationally active bank, which
situates branches as portfolio items.

Some institutions find attraction in exploring iurisdictions they perceive as relatirc.
and low level

of

sophistication. The thinking is that the systems and strategy

of

lotv is.

the cross-

border banks should confer competitive advantage on them in their host countries,

as banks

that ate already in operation in such markets are not as soph.isticated as the cross-border
banks.

Adedipe: Cross-Border Banks: Threat or Opportunity to Economic Growth

Opportunities for liquidity enhanc ement thrcugh

net de?otit

t4s

n0Uli<ation has also made cross-

border banking attractive to some institutions, in an atgument similar to that of domestic
banks that decide to expand into any segment

of the domestic banking market that promises

such business opportunity. Some banking market segments offer ptedominandy deposit

grovth opportunities, some lending others international rade,

of the 'hub-and-spoke' or 'modulat'

concept

of

etc. Whether in the context

branching, every branch finds strategic

relevance in the corpotate business portfolio, vhether in the domestic or foreign banking

matket.

As well, there is the often undisclosed 'mission'

of tegulatory arbitraging by ctoss-border

banks. They go with the perception that regu.lation in their host country is not as restrictive
as

in their home country, and therefore, they would have mote roomfor o?eratiotal marcnret

that could confer proEt advantage that is elusive in their home country. Such banks usually
adopt very com?bx slntclures znd o?erations

gtstem

that ate ostensibly designed to confuse ot

fool the regulators and othet stakeholders in their host/home countdes.

III.

StylizedFacts

Quite logical alguments have been made in the literature and several evidence-based
research into cross-border banking that underscore the devance of such banks to
economic gtouth, thtough encouraging competition that enhances efrcieng. At *re same

time, cross-border banks have been proved to constitute t rtruidalk_lbreet to financial
sability, and this is especially so in times of crisis.
Claessens (2006) listedfuu

i.

Cross-border

context

i.
in.

of

n!!b!of

cross-border banking as:

s,Q?t, i.e., the ttaditional tade in goods and services, which in the
finance means capital flows.

Corstmption abroad,e.g-,obtzring some financial services while tmveling.
Comnercial presence, i.e.,

the production

of a good ot service within the country,

which means the foreign establishment in a host market

iv.

The pnsnu

of persots

in the host country, e.g., solicitation of inswance products by

agents ftaveling to the countfy.
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The third mode is the primary reference in this PaPer. Structuralll', cross-border banks
organtze as head-afrnis-d-is branch where the head ofFrce is in the home country and every
other location is reated

as

abranch. Cross-border banks also operate th rotsgh subsidiaies,the

Pare$bmk being in the home country while the subsidiaries can be involved in anything
from banking to insurance and investrnent/asset management. Given their sheer size and
the proportion they control of the banking market of their host countries, some cfossborder banks can be qwtte gstenic.This raises concetns about financial instability whenever
there is

a

crisis.

The arguments have fallen into two planks of 'Too-Big-To-Fail QBTF) ard'Too-Big-To-Rtscd

GBTR).The former recognizes that failure of a cross-border bank can trigger contagion
thtough its systemic risk and cause other banks inits host country to fail. The latterconsiders
that the regu.latory authorities of the host counffy mi gtrt lack

the

ca?ariy to rescue a failing

ot

failed cross-border bank. There have been instances where the cross-botder bankis gtstemic

in its bost roanh'y. whereas it is not in its home countn'. A few Nigerian banks have this
attribute in the West A frican sub-region.

Mayes (2006) alluded to the Swedish Nordea Banking Grorp in thts respect. As at March 2004,

Nordea accounted for the followhg proportions of the banking market
cent), De,tnark (25.0 per cent),

S wedea

n Finknd (40.0 per

(20.0 per cent) and Norwal (15.0 per cent),

as

well

as

Finla / (35.0 per cent) , Dennark (20,0 per cent),
^t
Swedefl (6.0 per cent). The failure of Nordea, therefore, could

the following in the insurance markets

NonE

(9.0 per cent)

mean the collapse

of

^nd

the banking system

and/or insurance market in anyof these countries.

Cross-border banking has been argu ed to have P@illlgfuE on

to financial

figllgtand

services and promotes stabilig. TLrrs was succincdy

deaelopnent, 4ggggg

put by Eisenbeis and

Kaufman (200f as follows.
"lt is senerallv arpued that kreipn owzershib of banks increases rumbetitior and efrrienn
itt tbe barking sector of tbe bost coltt@, re&ras isk e9osnes tbrorgh gnater
seoprabhital and indtstrial diuersifrratiol. ald elhrses lhe aoq'esale aaarrtitu o{ rabital
iruested in the banking nctor. Indted, Jonign errtry tbrl gh direct irtestnent is viful1
recommendtd fot researchers and arallsts as a means of strengtheringweak and ineficient
banking shlctura,
in emerging economies- Tbis is becatse banles tbat are

paninkr!

willing and abh to ettter a foreign comtry, especial! deueloping etonomies, tbrorgb direct

Adedipe: Cross-Border Banks: Threat or Opportunity to Economic Growth
inrestments are generall1 larger,

in

bealtbier

frandal

147

condition, nore prortssiznalb

mataged, and more tecbnicalfi adtannd tban tbe arerage bost

rlsnfiJ

barrks,

a

d,r1E/

tberefore be expected to raise tbe barJor all banks.

Foreign ownership of banks uies great!'t amongcorntries.In Nigeria, there are only three banks
(or 13 per cent) having dominant foreign shareholding, whereas in Sierra Leone, 77 per cent

of

the banks are foreign. In the Euopean Union (EI-.f , foreign ownetship avenges 58 pet

cent in t}re ten new EU member states as compared with

a

weighted average

of

16 pet cent

for the older EU members.

Notwithstanding the benefits that might accrue to foreign ownership, cross-border banking
through either branching or subsidiaries raises a null:,ber of in?ortant ?oliq issses, especially
when there is a threat of financial instability. These concerns have been atgued as
particularly important u/ith respect to the provision of
bradefllial repslatiol. the strensth

of

de?osit ixstrarce,

market disrioline. the tim.ins

ittsotuiol qfuiafuiulifuu!andplacingitin reaiursbb,

of

the effectiveness

of

declarins an insolvent

and the procedures for resolving bank

irsolurcies.

For their empirical analysis though, Eisenbeis and Kaufrnan (2007) fo atsed on the Etro?ean

Uniot becztse

of its peculiarities

large economic and financial system, with certain

structures fot and conffols on cross-border banking:

A. Provision of a shgh barkinglicense.
b. Home country x provider of dt?otit instrance.
c. Home countryin charge of the apphcaionof the banknQtqtprocesses.
d. Host country responslble forflatotltlalili!..
e. Host country responsible for the lender last resort.
Cross-border banks pose regtknry cbalhnges in five possible siruations they might find
themselves:

i.

lt'mrmal

times.

when the bank is compliant with tegulations and performing

competitively in the market.

ii.

In dffictit tinu,

when, although the bank is compliant with regulations,

it

is

underperforming in the market. This should otdinarily be soned out by market
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discipline, which unfortunately might not be orderly.

in.

kr

iv

Dtinggstemic ercnts,when although the bank is itself compliant with regulations, its

of btgbk4!,when the bank has become undercapitalized and the authorities
require action if the bankis to remain hbusiness.
nmes

viability is affected by outside shocks to the system.

v

In

acual or inninefi defatlt, when the bank can no longer continue in normal

operation and the authorities have to step in.
Eisenbeis and Kaufman (2007) further posited that:
"Cmst-border banking throagb foreign-onued branchx or subsidiaies car stbject
enteinginstitltiols to nultipb reglato?.itisdictiols and regslators, as wellas

tbe

to natl dfferenl legal $,stens. As a runseqmnre, operating across borders presents
potential problen:for srcb banles bqod tbefact that there arejwt nore regtlations

tofollow or regtlator aho na1 baue diferent inrcntiaes. Bank laus cat ffirgreat!
euen be conflictittg actlsr the ffirent comtriu, Therefore, reg atorl
compliana mE be tncertain and dific tfor bankitg orgati7ations uith
tiple

ard ,tal

n

coanhl operations. Ftrtherztore, bank uperuisors and regtlators in botb bome and
bost counhies upica$ operak in abat tbq c1nrider is ifi the but inkrut of their
coantry, hoaeaer dtf ned orperceiwd (Bolkrd, 200 5). "

These issues make ctoss-border banking quite a complicated matteq and yet they create

a

window fot misbehaviour for organizations having the intendon to break the rules. There is
the conventional wisdom that cross-border (geographic) mergershave the

bank (and thus regulators)

isk a! insolyengt, following
a

to

p1fugg

Segal (1974), Vander Venner (1996)

and Berget (2000). This rests on the notion that it is better for
in one basket" and thus geographic diversification is

poteni

a

bank not to put all its "eggs

riskreducing activity.

However, offsetting these perceived benefits are at least two potential costs that may well
enhance the risk

of

bank insolvency and ultimately the risk exposure

of

bank regulators.

The first of these risk-increasing effects arises from the incentive of under-pricing of the
regulatory "safety net" and its associated implicit and explicit guarantees. As discussed by
John,John, and Senbet (1991) andJohn, Saunders, and Senbet (2000), banks have incentives

to 'tncrease thek isk e$orure beyond the level that would be privately optimal in a wodd in
which there were no safety net guarantees or the safety net (deposit insurance, capital
requiremeots, and implicidy, bank closue) is fairly priced. This is the noral bavzrd mgle to
cross-border bankiflg.

Adedipe: Cross-Border Banks: Threat or Opportunity to Economic Growth
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second reason why cross-border acquisitions may increase an acquitet's risk concerns

"who is watching the eggs in the basket", as argued by riTinton (1999). Specifically, by
extending its operations into new overseas markets, the (domestic) bank is confronted with
potentially new and risk increasing monitoring problems related to the loan customer base,
the operating cost sttucture, liquidiry etc,

of

that whether an acquiter's risk rises or falls as

the tatget bank. Amihud et. al. (2002) suggest
a

result of

a

cross-bordet acquisition is highly

idiosyncratic. They found that, on average, there is no evidence that ctoss-bordet merging

banks add to the risk exposure

looking at the total risk

of

of

either domestic or host country regulators, whether

the acquirer ot its systematic risk relative to various banking

industty indexes (home, host, wodd). These results hold for cross-border mergers in
general and forvarious sub-samples

of interegional cross-border mergers.

Buch et. al. (2005) used data for France, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S., and found that

to benefit from diuersfriry isks on theit balance sheet by lending
internationally thtough an imptovement in the risk-return tradeoff due to the
banks are likely

diversification of location (country)-specific risks. They went on to infer that the estimated
gains from cross-botder diversification appeat considerable, but found a pattetn

of ovet-

investment in tlle domestic economy of the reporting country.

The quality of information on cross-border banks that are available to the home and host
regulators is

a

reflection of the size and structure of the banking system. Bauch et. al.(2005)

present evidence for the U.S. that consolidation has led to

bg-kuttgto

a

gteater distance and thereby to

more opaque SMEs, citing Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2005) as

well as Carow, Kane and Marayaman (2004), Karceski, Ongena and Smith (2005), Sapienza
(2002), Degryse and, Masschelein and Mitchell, (2005).

The factthat

too

muh com?etitiott can undermine stability and lead to financial crises has been

often argued (Allen and Gale,2004), although difficult to document systematically @ecL,
Dermirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2002). These complex relationships and tradeoffs among
competition, financial system performance, access to Enancing stability, and finally gowth
a.lteady make

it clear that it is not

su

fftcierrt to alzlyze

a

narrow concept of competitiveness

alone.

"T;tiff#o
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to

become increasingly significant as banking
organizations expand and consolidate many of their management and record keeping
functions to achieve cost efficiencies. @isenbeis and Kaufman, 200!. Schiiler (2003)

The in

are likely

roblerus

argues that this problem

of

rzlation

dccess

constitutes a form of agency ptoblem between

the home and host countfy regulatof.

Following Ingves (2007), the major challenges (or threats) of cross-border banking include:

1.
2.
3.
4.

contasion.

Interdtbendezre that causes

De cisions by national auth oines *,rllhave

The

legal

in

icartons

for foreign countries.

distirction between branches and subsidiaries has become blurred.

Supervision and crisis management becomes com?licated as more regulatory
authorities get involved.

5.

Conflictin gnaiotzl hterests.

w.

Infetences and Recommendations

Based on these stylized facts

from existing literature and the more recent experience of

Nigerian banks that aggressively began to putsue ctoss-border banking, arguments have
been made thzt a S?ecial bodJ should be created to supervise internationally active banks.

Such considerations ate, however, more popular with tespect to Europe because that
jurisdiction has wimessed a rapid increase in the number

of cross-border banks through

mergers and acquisitions in the last 25 yeats.

The desire to regtlate

ban king

tightlt has also been tempered with the argument that reguladon

sdfles competition, product development, efficiency and ptopet risk management.
Achieving a balance between adequate regulation and encouraging (rather than stifling)
commetce has been quite

a

challenge.

The recommendations of the Basel Working Committee (1996) on the supervision of
cross-border banking are quite instructive for the Centrai Bank

collabotation with the regulatory authorities

of

of

Nigeria, working in

countries into which Nigeda-Iicensed

banks have expanded their operations. These recommendations are as follows:

i.

Improve the aress of

bome suPeruisors

consolidated supervision.

to information

necessary

for

effective

l5l

Adedipe: Cross-Border Banks: Threat or Opportunity to Economic GroMh

11.

Improve the

access

of

bosl sbemisors

to information flecessary for effective host

superrrision.

iii

Ensure that all ctoss-border banking operuaors xe g4li144B4fufuhome and host
supervision.

The reportwent on to indicate that access to information is the most ctitical of these three.

i.

Ensuring that all cross-border banking operations ate subiect to effective home and
host supetvision.

.
.
.
.
ii.

Branch/subsidiary to home office.
Home office to home supervisor

Branch/subsidiary to host supervisor
Host supervisor to home supervisor

Characteristics

of

the information required by home supetvisors for ongoing

supervision

'
.
Iv.
v

Quantitative

Qualiative

lnspections by home country supervisors
Serious criminal activities

Tfrese were summarized differendy by Eisenbeis and Kaufman

i,
ii.
iii.
iv.

(200'f

as

follows:

Prom?t legal clos,/reof institutions before they become economically insolvent.

Promot identification of rL ims

and assisrrment of loises.

PromDtreobclfusajLjhtifuUtllilslilt!,^nd
Prompt reea?ital4ryrnd re-?riuti{ation of failed institutions.

In the consultative document issued in September 2009 by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (fot comments by 31st December 2009), the following recommendations
emerged ftom an extensive review

Fottis (subsantial

of literature and examination of four case

studies

of

in Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemboug), Dexia
(Belgium, France and Luxemboutg, quite significant in Luxemboutg), Kaupthing
subsidiaries

@tanches and subsidiaries

in 13 jurisdictions) and I-ehman Brothets (2,985 legal entities

that operated in some 50 countries)

.
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of financialgroups.

nadonal resolution measures.

a

Convergence

a

Cross- border effeds

a

F.;edtctJ.ort of con?leiy

Plannitg h

Economic and Financial

aduance

of national resolution

measures.

irrtercofinectedners

^nd
for orderly resolution.

of grouP sffuctures

a

Cross-bord,er cooPerafi on and information sharing.

a

Strengtlrening risk n i iga t i o n m e r har i s m s.

a

Trunsfer of

a

Exit strategies

ran trattsa I rela

and oPerations.

f onshios.

an d narket discibline-

More specifically the document highlights the /errarr from each of the four case studies

as

follows:
Fortis

.

The usefulness of formal supervisory crisis management tools appears to be limited
in a situationwhere theinstitution needs to be stabilized rapidly and at the same time
the continuity of business needs to be ensuredin more than one jurisdiction.

I

Tension between the need to maintain financial stabfiqi for which a bank under
certain circumsances needs to be resolved in the public interest and with public
support, and the position of the shateholders of such a bank (i.e. dilution of their
stake).

.

Despite a long-standing relationship in ongoing supervision and infotmation
sharing, the Dutch and Belgian supervisory authorities assessed the situation
differendy. Differences in the assessment of available information and the sense of
urgency complicated the resolution.

Dexra

Wlile the cefltralization of

liqtlidiU nanagement within a cross-border group could

lead to some tensions in case

of liquidity problems,

these tensions can be overcome

by adequate cooperation between the relevaflt central banks.

The cross-border nanrre

of

the group makes the resol ior

process

more time

consumingbut this ptoblem is not insurmountable in a case in which home and host
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authorities cleady state their,oint supportto the group.

Kaupthing

.

The Icelandic crisis revealed how limitations

of

natioral rennces and, potentially,

crn tffect the ability to respond to a crisis involving financial
institutions that had become "too big" for the home jurisdiction to ptovide
sqeflisnO

cd?acil-lt

effective consolidated supervision of to take necessafy crisis management and
resolution actions.

.

Cross-border expansion can create its own risks

of effective supetvision

r

Vhere

a

of

umaruged gronth in the absence

by home authorities.

srouo is cross-border in nanrre with sisti&cznt intrd-omab chims there ts o,

need for effective and extensive coopemtion and dialogue home to hosg host to
home and, depending on the circumstances, possiblyalso host to host.

khman Brothers

.

If

an acquirer for the entire

frm

can be found

n

an afuro?iate tinescab, tl:ad:ag

counterpatties and other paties ptoviding short-term funding will expect some
sort of guarantee in the interim for them to continue to do business with the fum
until the uansaction closes this can be challenging to achieve in a tight timeftame.

.

As tlre amounts

of liqridill

tuded are likely to be sizable, governmental resources

may be required.

.

For international

frms

and groups

of

this degree

of conPbi|,

a prepared,

ordetly

resolution plan would be of great assistance to the authorities;

.
I

Monitoingby regulators and the interplay of insolvency regimes are important;

Group stryclures create intetdependencies within the organization that responsible
regulators need to understand and monitor for both going concern and gone
concern purPoses;

.

In the event of the failue of

a

cross-border financial institution, once the relevant

enter into insolvency proceedings, the insolvency regimes
applicable to t}re maior entities are likely to be separate ptoceedings, serving
mm?onent erlilies

different policies, with different priorities and objectives; and

.

These differences continue

to

make coordinatior tnd. cooberatiott amons insolvencv
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